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"Court Under Roberts Is Most
Conservative in Decades"
The New York Times
July 24, 2010
Adam Liptak
When Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and
his colleagues on the Supreme Court left for
their summer break at the end of June, they
marked a milestone: the Roberts court had
just completed its fifth term.
In those five years, the court not only moved
to the right but also became the most
conservative one in living memory, based on
an analysis of four sets of political science
data.
And for all the public debate about the
confirmation of Elena Kagan or the addition
last year of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, there is
no reason to think they will make a
difference in the court's ideological balance.
Indeed, the data show that only one recent
replacement altered its direction, that of
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. for Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor in 2006, pulling the
court to the right.
There is no similar switch on the horizon.
That means that Chief Justice Roberts, 55, is
settling in for what is likely to be a very long
tenure at the head of a court that seems to be
entering a period of stability.
If the Roberts court continues on the course
suggested by its first five years, it is likely to
allow a greater role for religion in public
life, to permit more participation by unions
and corporations in elections and to
elaborate further on the scope of the Second
Amendment's right to bear arms. Abortion
rights are likely to be curtailed, as are
affirmative action and protections for people
accused of crimes.
The recent shift to the right is modest. And
the court's decisions have hardly been
uniformly conservative. The justices have,
for instance, limited the use of the death
penalty and rejected broad claims of
executive power in the government's efforts
to combat terrorism.
But scholars who look at overall trends
rather than individual decisions say that
widely accepted political science data tell an
unmistakable story about a notably
conservative court.
Almost all judicial decisions, they say, can
be assigned an ideological value. Those
favoring, say, prosecutors and employers are
said to be conservative, while those favoring
criminal defendants and people claiming
discrimination are said to be liberal.
Analyses of databases coding Supreme
Court decisions and justices' votes along
these lines, one going back to 1953 and
another to 1937, show that the Roberts court
has staked out territory to the right of the
two conservative courts that immediately
preceded it by four distinct measures:
In its first five years, the Roberts court
issued conservative decisions 58 percent of
the time. And in the term ending a year ago,
the rate rose to 65 percent, the highest
number in any year since at least 1953.
The courts led by Chief Justices Warren E.
Burger, from 1969 to 1986, and William H.
Rehnquist, from 1986 to 2005, issued
conservative decisions at an almost
indistinguishable rate-55 percent of the
time.
That was a sharp break from the court led by
Chief Justice Earl Warren, from 1953 to
1969, in what liberals consider the Supreme
Court's golden age and conservatives
portray as the height of inappropriate
judicial meddling. That court issued
conservative decisions 34 percent of the
time.
Four of the six most conservative justices of
the 44 who have sat on the court since 1937
are serving now: Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Alito, Antonin Scalia and, most
conservative of all, Clarence Thomas. (The
other two were Chief Justices Burger and
Rehnquist.) Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
the swing justice on the current court, is in
the top 10.
The Roberts court is finding laws
unconstitutional and reversing precedent-
two measures of activism-no more often
than earlier courts. But the ideological
direction of the court's activism has
undergone a marked change toward
conservative results.
Until she retired in 2006, Justice O'Connor
was very often the court's swing vote, and in
her later years she had drifted to the center-
left. These days, Justice Kennedy has
assumed that crucial role at the court's
center, moving the court to the right.
Justice John Paul Stevens, who retired in
June, had his own way of tallying the court's
direction. In an interview in his chambers in
April, he said that every one of the 11
justices who had joined the court since 1975,
including himself, was more conservative
than his or her predecessor, with the possible
exceptions of Justices Sotomayor and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg.
The numbers largely bear this out, though
Chief Justice Roberts is slightly more liberal
than his predecessor, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, at least if all of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's 33 years on the court, 14 of
them as an associate justice, are considered.
(In later years, some of his views softened.)
But Justice Stevens did not consider the
question difficult. Asked if the replacement
of Chief Justice Rehnquist by Chief Justice
Roberts had moved the court to the right, he
did not hesitate.
"Oh, yes," Justice Stevens said.
The Most Significant Change
"Gosh," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said
at a law school forum in January a few days
after the Supreme Court undid one of her
major achievements by reversing a decision
on campaign spending limits. "I step away
for a couple of years and there's no telling
what's going to happen."
When Justice O'Connor announced her
retirement in 2005, the membership of the
Rehnquist court had been stable for 11
years, the second-longest stretch without a
new justice in American history.
Since then, the pace of change has been
dizzying, and several justices have said they
found it disorienting. But in an analysis of
the court's direction, some changes matter
much more than others. Chief Justice
Rehnquist died soon after Justice O'Connor
announced that she was stepping down. He
was replaced by Chief Justice Roberts, his
former law clerk. Justice David H. Souter
retired in 2009 and was succeeded by Justice
Sotomayor. Justice Stevens followed Justice
Souter this year, and he is likely to be
succeeded by Elena Kagan.
But not one of those three replacements
seems likely to affect the fundamental
ideological alignment of the court. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, a conservative, was
replaced by a conservative. Justices Souter
and Stevens, both liberals, have been or are
likely to be succeeded by liberals.
Justices' views can shift over time. Even if
they do not, a justice's place in the court's
ideological spectrum can move as new
justices arrive. And chief justices may be
able to affect the overall direction of the
court, notably by using the power to
determine who writes the opinion for the
court when they are in the majority. Chief
Justice Roberts is certainly widely viewed as
a canny tactician.
But only one change-Justice Alito's
replacement of Justice O'Connor-really
mattered. That move defines the Roberts
court. "That's a real switch in terms of
ideology and a switch in terms of outlook,"
said Lee Epstein, who teaches law and
political science at Northwestern University
and is a leading curator and analyst of
empirical data about the Supreme Court.
The point is not that Justice Alito has turned
out to be exceptionally conservative, though
he has: he is the third-most conservative
justice to serve on the court since 1937,
behind only Justice Thomas and Chief
Justice Rehnquist. It is that he replaced the
more liberal justice who was at the
ideological center of the court.
Though Chief Justice Roberts gets all the
attention, Justice Alito may thus be the
lasting triumph of the administration of
President George W. Bush. He thrust Justice
Kennedy to the court's center and has
reshaped the future of American law.
It is easy to forget that Justice Alito was Mr.
Asked at the law school forum in January
Bush's second choice. Had his first
nominee, the apparently less conservative
Harriet E. Miers, not withdrawn after a
rebellion from Mr. Bush's conservative
base, the nature of the Roberts court might
have been entirely different.
By the end of her almost quarter-century on
the court, Justice O'Connor was without
question the justice who controlled the result
in ideologically divided cases.
"On virtually all conceptual and empirical
definitions, O'Connor is the court's center-
the median, the key, the critical and the
swing justice," Andrew D. Martin and two
colleagues wrote in a study published in
2005 in The North Carolina Law Review
shortly before Justice O'Connor's
retirement.
With Justice Alito joining the court's more
conservative wing, Justice Kennedy has now
unambiguously taken on the role of the
justice at the center of the court, and the
ideological daylight between him and
Justice O'Connor is a measure of the
Roberts court's shift to the right.
Justice O'Connor, for her part, does not
name names but has expressed misgivings
about the direction of the court.
"If you think you've been helpful, and then
it's dismantled, you think, 'Oh, dear,"' she
said at William & Mary Law School in
October in her usual crisp and no-nonsense
fashion. "But life goes on. It's not always
positive."
Justice O'Connor was one of the authors of
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
a 2003 decision that, among other things,
upheld restrictions on campaign spending by
businesses and unions. It was reversed on
that point in the Citizens United decision.
how she felt about the later decision, she
responded obliquely. But there was no
mistaking her meaning.
"If you want my legal opinion" about
Citizens United, Justice O'Connor said,
"you can go read" McConnell.
The Court Without O'Connor
The shift resulting from Justice O'Connor's
departure was more than ideological. She
brought with her qualities that are no longer
represented on the court. She was raised and
educated in the West, and she served in all
three branches of Arizona's government,
including as a government lawyer, majority
leader of the State Senate, an elected trial
judge and an appeals court judge.
Those experiences informed Justice
O'Connor's sensitivity to states' rights and
her frequent deference to political
judgments. Her rulings were often pragmatic
and narrow, and her critics said she engaged
in split-the-difference jurisprudence.
Justice Alito's background is more limited
than Justice O'Connor's-he worked in the
Justice Department and then as a federal
appeals court judge-and his rulings are
often more muscular.
Since they never sat on the court together,
trying to say how Justice O'Connor would
have voted in the cases heard by Justice
Alito generally involves extrapolation and
speculation. In some, though, it seems plain
that she would have voted differently from
him.
Just weeks before she left the court, for
instance, Justice O'Connor heard arguments
in Hudson v. Michigan, a case about
whether evidence should be suppressed
because it was found after Detroit police
Bag, a law journal. "It was Justice Alito
officers stormed a home without announcing
themselves.
"Is there no policy protecting the
homeowner a little bit and the sanctity of the
home from this immediate entry?" Justice
O'Connor asked a government lawyer.
David A. Moran, a lawyer for the defendant,
Booker T. Hudson, said the questioning left
him confident that he had Justice
O'Connor's crucial vote.
Three months later, the court called for
reargument, signaling a 4-to-4 deadlock
after Justice O'Connor's departure. When
the 5-to-4 decision was announced in June,
the court not only ruled that violations of the
knock-and-announce rule do not require the
suppression of evidence, but also called into
question the exclusionary rule itself.
The shift had taken place. Justice Alito was
in the majority.
"My 5-4 loss in Hudson v. Michigan," Mr.
Moran wrote in 2006 in Cato Supreme
Court Review, "signals the end of the Fourth
Amendment"-protecting against
unreasonable searches---"as we know it."
The departure of Justice O'Connor very
likely affected the outcomes in two other
contentious areas: abortion and race.
In 2000, the court struck down a Nebraska
law banning an abortion procedure by a vote
of 5 to 4, with Justice O'Connor in the
majority. Seven years later, the court upheld
a similar federal law, the Partial-Birth
Abortion Act, by the same vote.
"The key to the case was not in the
difference in wording between the federal
law and the Nebraska act," Erwin
Chemerinsky wrote in 2007 in The Green
having replaced Justice O'Connor."
In 2003, Justice O'Connor wrote the
majority opinion in a 5-to-4 decision
allowing public universities to take account
of race in admissions decisions. And a
month before her retirement in 2006, the
court refused to hear a case challenging the
use of race to achieve integration in public
schools.
Almost as soon as she left, the court
reversed course. A 2007 decision limited the
use of race for such a purpose, also on a 5-
to-4 vote.
There were, to be sure, issues on which
Justice Kennedy was to the left of Justice
O'Connor. In a 5-to-4 decision in 2005
overturning the juvenile death penalty,
Justice Kennedy was in the majority and
Justice O'Connor was not.
But changing swing justices in 2006 had an
unmistakable effect across a broad range of
cases. "O'Connor at the end was quite a bit
more liberal than Kennedy is now,"
Professor Epstein said.
The numbers bear this out.
The Rehnquist court had trended left in its
later years, issuing conservative rulings less
than half the time in its last two years in
divided cases, a phenomenon not seen since
1981. The first term of the Roberts court
was a sharp jolt to the right. It issued
conservative rulings in 71 percent of divided
cases, the highest rate in any year since the
beginning of the Warren court in 1953.
Judging by the Numbers
Chief Justice Roberts has not served nearly
as long as his three most recent
predecessors. The court he leads has been in
flux. But five years of data are now
available, and they point almost uniformly
in one direction: to the right.
Scholars quarrel about some of the
methodological choices made by political
scientists who assign a conservative or
liberal label to Supreme Court decisions and
the votes of individual justices. But most of
those arguments are at the margins, and the
measures are generally accepted in the
political science literature.
The leading database, created by Harold J.
Spaeth with the support of the National
Science Foundation about 20 years ago, has
served as the basis for a great deal of
empirical research on the contemporary
Supreme Court and its members. In the
database, votes favoring criminal
defendants, unions, people claiming
discrimination or violation of their civil
rights are, for instance, said to be liberal.
Decisions striking down economic
regulations and favoring prosecutors,
employers and the government are said to be
conservative.
About 1 percent of cases have no ideological
valence, as in a boundary dispute between
two states. And some concern multiple
issues or contain ideological cross-currents.
But while it is easy to identify the occasional
case for which ideological coding makes no
sense, the vast majority fit pretty well. They
also tend to align with the votes of the
justices usually said to be liberal or
conservative.
Still, such coding is a blunt instrument. It
does not take account of the precedential
and other constraints that are in play or how
much a decision moves the law in a
conservative or liberal direction. The mix of
cases has changed over time. And the
database treats every decision, monumental
or trivial, as a single unit.
"It's crazy to count each case as one," said
Frank B. Cross, a law and business professor
at the University of Texas. "But the problem
of counting each case as one is reduced by
the fact that the less-important ones tend to
be unanimous."
Some judges find the entire enterprise
offensive.
"Supreme Court justices do not
acknowledge that any of their decisions are
influenced by ideology rather than by
neutral legal analysis," William M. Landes,
an economist at the University of Chicago,
and Richard A. Posner, a federal appeals
court judge, wrote last year in The Journal
of Legal Analysis. But if that were true, they
continued, knowing the political party of the
president who appointed a given justice
would tell you nothing about how the justice
was likely to vote in ideologically charged
cases.
In fact, the correlation between the political
party of appointing presidents and the
ideological direction of the rulings of the
judges they appoint is quite strong.
Here, too, there are exceptions. Justices
Stevens and Souter were appointed by
Republican presidents and ended up voting
with the court's liberal wing. But they are
gone. If Ms. Kagan wins Senate
confirmation, all of the justices on the court
may be expected to align themselves across
the ideological spectrum in sync with the
party of the president who appointed them.
The proposition that the Roberts court is to
the right of even the quite conservative
courts that preceded it thus seems fairly well
established. But it is subject to
qualifications.
First, the rightward shift is modest.
Second, the data do not take popular
attitudes into account. While the court is
quite conservative by historical standards, it
is less so by contemporary ones. Public
opinion polls suggest that about 30 percent
of Americans think the current court is too
liberal, and almost half think it is about
right.
On given legal issues, too, the court's
decisions are often closely aligned with or
more liberal than public opinion, according
to studies collected in 2008 in "Public
Opinion and Constitutional Controversy"
(Oxford University Press).
The public is largely in sync with the court,
for instance, in its attitude toward
abortion-in favor of a right to abortion but
sympathetic to many restrictions on that
right.
"Solid majorities want the court to uphold
Roe v. Wade and are in favor of abortion
rights in the abstract," one of the studies
concluded. "However, equally substantial
majorities favor procedural and other
restrictions, including waiting periods,
parental consent, spousal notification and
bans on 'partial birth' abortion."
Similarly, the public is roughly aligned with
the court in questioning affirmative action
plans that use numerical standards or
preferences while approving those that allow
race to be considered in less definitive ways.
The Roberts court has not yet decided a
major religion case, but the public has not
always approved of earlier rulings in this
area. For instance, another study in the 2008
book found that "public opinion has
remained solidly against the court's
landmark decisions declaring school prayer
unconstitutional."
In some ways, the Roberts court is more
cautious than earlier ones. The Rehnquist
court struck down about 120 laws, or about
six a year, according to an analysis by
Professor Epstein. The Roberts court, which
on average hears fewer cases than the
Rehnquist court did, has struck down fewer
laws-15 in its first five years, or three a
year.
It is the ideological direction of the
decisions that has changed. When the
Rehnquist court struck down laws, it
reached a liberal result more than 70 percent
of the time. The Roberts court has tilted
strongly in the opposite direction, reaching a
conservative result 60 percent of the time.
The Rehnquist court overruled 45
precedents over 19 years. Sixty percent of
those decisions reached a conservative
result. The Roberts court overruled eight
precedents in its first five years, a slightly
lower annual rate. All but one reached a
conservative result.
"What 'Pro Business' Supreme Court?"
Washington Examiner
May 20, 2010
Daniel J. Popeo
Over the past several months, some
politicians and activists have intensified
their campaign to label the U.S. Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Roberts'
leadership as reflexively "pro-business."
A close examination of these arguments
reveals the claim to be little more than an
inside-the-Beltway urban legend. But even
more troubling than the misleading facts
being presented is the broader, underlying
message activists want to implant in the
public's mind. They want Americans to see
the judiciary as a political body whose
business verdicts are biased and harmful to
our well-being.
The notion of a pro-business Supreme Court
has been a favorite "populist" refrain of
politicians for some time. This spring,
activist groups and sympathetic academics
have produced "reports" on the Supreme
Court and its business cases during Chief
Justice Roberts' tenure.
The assertions of these studies have in turn
been parroted in news stories, op-eds, and
cable news shows. And on the day President
Obama announced his nominee to replace
Justice Stevens, three activist organizations
sponsored a full page advocacy ad in The
Washington Post accusing the Court of
being a corporate subsidiary.
Court critics have especially focused their
ire on the 2009 Citizens United campaign
finance ruling, where five justices
recognized the First Amendment rights of
companies and other state-created entities.
But the labeling campaign has gone far
beyond Citizens United, with activists citing
decisions involving punitive damages,
environmental and health regulations, and
even procedural rules affecting civil
litigation. The criticism of certain Court
decisions solely on the basis that the
business litigant prevailed represents one-
dimensional advocacy in its most
disingenuous form.
The Court's recent rulings on punitive
damages, for instance, rely on a long line of
cases which respect all civil litigation
defendants' due process rights to be free
from arbitrary and excessive punishment.
Instead of acknowledging that justices such
as Breyer and Souter either authored or
joined majority opinions in damages cases
involving tobacco and oil defendants,
activists instead dwell on these cases'
factual underpinnings to demonize the
outcomes.
Activists have also lambasted the Court for
rulings that in effect limit litigation against
FDA-approved medical products, but omit
the detail that federal law explicitly permits
such "federal preemption."
If the justices are in fact working on behalf
of U.S. businesses, they probably should be
fired: A more complete look at the Supreme
Court's rulings in commercial cases reveals
numerous instances where business interests
lost, and lost big.
In its current term, for example, the Court
unanimously held for the plaintiffs in a
securities fraud class action case;
unanimously upheld shareholder suits
against investment advisors; and permitted
federal class action lawsuits in a state which
prohibits such suits.
Last year, the justices rejected the
preemption arguments of drug makers and
allowed state tort suits against FDA-
approved drugs. In 2008, the Court upheld
state fraud suits against cigarette
manufacturers. These are but a few
examples.
But let's assume for argument's sake that
one can fairly label a judicial decision "pro-
business." Is there something inherently
wrong with that? Those who have been
accusing the Court of a corporate bias
certainly think so.
Activists and their allies subtly imply that
when businesses win in the courts,
Americans lose. They have it exactly
backwards. A business is created, run, and
staffed by people, and it offers useful and
needed products and services to the public.
Real people thus suffer when businesses are
denied constitutional rights, or are
threatened by abusive prosecutors or
shackled with capricious regulations and
lawsuits. Those enterprises will struggle to
create new jobs, generate positive returns for
shareholders, contribute to pension plans,
and provide consumers with new
innovations. Isn't that the opposite of what
hard-working Americans need?
What businesses do seek from the judiciary
is a fair hearing, protection of their rights,
and a measure of predictability in the law.
As Justice Breyer noted in an opinion this
year involving a critical jurisdictional matter
which had widely split the lower courts,
"Predictability is valuable to corporations
making business and investment decisions."
In other business-related cases, Supreme
Court justices from across the ideological
spectrum have embraced and noted this need
for clarity and consistency.
The ultimate goal of this smear campaign
seems to be convincing Americans that the
judiciary is just another political body with
an ideological ax to grind. Over the next
month, the examination of a Supreme Court
nominee and the Court's release of nearly 40
opinions will occur simultaneously.
Special interest legal activists will conflate
the two and lecture us on how there's really
no difference between the political and
judicial processes. They'll label disfavored
Court rulings as further proof of a pro-
business agenda and demand that the
nominee reject such opinions now in her
hearings and on the bench if she's
confirmed.
Hopefully, the public will view this charade
skeptically and keep the basic principles
taught in Civics 101, not to mention the U.S.
Constitution, in mind-legislatures make the
laws, and the judiciary interprets them.
"Obama and Supreme Court May
Be on Collision Course"
Los Angeles Times
July 6, 2010
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court wrapped up its term last
week after landmark decisions protecting the
right to have a gun and the right of
corporations to spend freely on elections.
But the year's most important moment may
have come on the January evening when the
justices gathered at the Capitol for President
Obama's State of the Union address.
They had no warning about what was
coming.
Obama and his advisors had weighed how to
respond to the court's ruling the week
before, which gave corporations the same
free-spending rights as ordinary Americans.
They saw the ruling as a rash, radical move
to tilt the political system toward big
business as they coped with the fallout from
the Wall Street collapse.
Some advisors counseled caution, but the
president opted to criticize the conservative
justices in the uncomfortable spotlight of
national television as Senate Democrats
roared their approval.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. is still
angered by what he saw as a highly partisan
insult to the independent judiciary. The
incident put a public spotlight on the deep
divide between the Obama White House and
the Roberts court, one that could have a
profound effect in the years ahead.
The president and congressional Democrats
have embarked on an ambitious drive to
regulate corporations, banks, health insurers
and the energy industry. But the high court,
with Roberts increasingly in control, will
have the final word on those regulatory
laws.
Many legal experts foresee a clash between
Obama's progressive agenda and the
conservative court.
"Presidents with active agendas for change
almost always encounter resistance in the
courts," said Stanford University law
professor Michael W. McConnell, a former
federal appellate court judge. "It happened
to [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and it happened
to Reagan. It will likely happen to Obama
too."
Already, the healthcare overhaul law,
Obama's signal achievement, is under attack
in the courts. Republican attorneys general
from 20 states have sued, insisting the law
and its mandate to buy health insurance
exceed Congress' power and trample on
states' rights.
Two weeks ago, a federal judge in New
Orleans ruled Obama had overstepped his
authority by ordering a six-month
moratorium on deep-water drilling in the
Gulf of Mexico.
On another front, the administration says it
will soon go to court in Phoenix seeking to
block Arizona's controversial immigration
law, which is due to take effect July 29.
Republican Gov. Jan Brewer said Arizona
would go to the Supreme Court, if
necessary, to preserve the law.
As chief justice, Roberts has steered the
court on a conservative course, one that
often has tilted toward business. For
example, the justices have made it much
harder for investors or pension funds to sue
companies for stock fraud.
Two years ago, the court declared for the
first time that the gun rights of individuals
were protected by the Constitution. This
year, the justices made clear this was a
"fundamental" right that extended to cities
and states as well as federal jurisdictions.
Since the arrival in 2006 of Justice Samuel
A. Alito Jr., Roberts has had a five-member
majority skeptical of campaign funding
restrictions. At first, he moved cautiously.
Roberts spoke for the majority in 2007 in
saying that a preelection broadcast ad
sponsored by a nonprofit corporation was
protected as free speech even though it
criticized a candidate for office.
Last year, the court had before it another
seemingly minor challenge to election laws
by a group that wanted permission to sell a
DVD that slammed Hillary Rodham Clinton
when she was running for president in 2008.
This time, however, Roberts decided on a
much bolder move.
The 5-4 ruling in the Citizens United case
struck down all limits on direct election
spending-for giant, profit-making
corporations as well as small nonprofit
groups. For more than 60 years, Congress
and many states had barred corporate and
union spending to sway elections. The
court's opinion dismissed all such laws as
unconstitutional censorship.
The decision came as a "real shock to the
administration and to the Democrats in
emphasizing that the court has long said
Congress," said Simon Lazarus, counsel for
the National Senior Citizens Law Center.
"It's also caused a sea change in their
thinking about the court. Before, it was all
about the 'culture wars' issues, like abortion,
prayer and gay rights. Afterward, they saw
this new activist thrust among the
conservatives as a direct threat to their
legislative agenda."
The change was on full display in last
week's Senate hearing on Supreme Court
nominee Elena Kagan. Democrats accused
the high court of judicial activism in favor of
corporations-"particularly by the five
Republican appointees who have steered so
hard to the fight," said Sen. Sheldon
Whitehouse (D-R.I.).
Republicans in the hearing targeted
Obama's "tremendous expansion" of the
government and argued for the court to
aggressively restrain Congress and the
White House. "The Supreme Court .
ought to go for freedom, not more
government," said Sen. Tom Coburn (R-
Okla.).
Obama chose Kagan for the court believing
she could bridge the gap with some of its
conservatives. Her mission is to help uphold
the laws that Obama and Democrats are
pushing through Congress.
During her hearing, Kagan found herself in
the odd spot of defending judicial restraint
before senators who usually worry aloud
about sending a "judicial activist" to the
court.
"Can you name for me any economic
activity that the federal government cannot
regulate under the commerce clause?" asked
Sen. John Cornyn (R- Texas).
"I wouldn't try to," Kagan replied,
lawmakers have broad powers to regulate
economic activity.
The high court, however, will decide
whether making Americans buy health
insurance amounts to economic activity.
It may be another year or two before a true
challenge to the Obama agenda reaches the
Supreme Court.
McConnell, the law professor, said the
administration's broad set of regulatory
moves made a clash almost inevitable. "It
does not mean the courts are being
'political,"' he said. "It is the way the
institutions are designed, to create checks
and balances."
"Supreme Court vs. Obama:
The Battle Lines Are Drawn"
Newsmax
July 6, 2010
David A. Patten
President Obama appears set on a collision
course with the conservative-leaning
Supreme Court over the constitutionality of
his administration's transformative
legislative agenda, legal scholars say.
Partisan battles over the Supreme Court
nomination of Elena Kagan, combined with
the administration's proposals to change
established policy dramatically in fields
ranging from healthcare to financial
regulation to energy and immigration, make
it likely that Obama and the court's
conservative majority increasingly will be at
loggerheads, these experts say.
"I was struck by the coordinated attacks on
the Supreme Court by liberals on the
Judiciary Committee," Tom Fitton, president
of the conservative Judicial Watch
organization, tells Newsmax. "I cannot
recall any similar, sustained attacks on the
high court in all my years in Washington. It
is likely discomforting to all the Supreme
Court justices. Obama and his liberal allies
are trying to politicize the Supreme Court in
a way not seen since FDR's attempt to pack
it with extra appointees."
One thing appears certain: Supreme Court
Justice John Roberts isn't likely to back
down to Obama. Roberts reportedly still is
angry over President Obama's decision to
use the State of the Union address to scold
the justices for their Citizens United v. FEC
ruling, which rejected limitations on
corporate and nonprofit electioneering.
When Obama said during the State of the
Union address that the ruling would "open
the floodgates" to donations by foreign
companies and other special interests to
influence U.S. elections, Justice Samuel
Alito mouthed the words "Not true."
Politifact, the independent fact-checking
organization, agreed with Alito. It rated the
president's statement "barely true," calling it
an exaggeration. In their majority opinion,
the justices specifically stated that their
decision would not overturn the
longstanding prohibition in 2 U.S.C.
441 e(b)(3) against any foreign-based
organization "directly or indirectly"
spending money to influence the outcome of
any U.S. election.
The president's decision to use his bully
pulpit to frame the ruling's political impact
incorrectly may have caused lasting damage
to his relationship with the judiciary. The
Los Angeles Times reported on Tuesday that
"Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. is still
angered by what he saw as a highly partisan
insult to the independent judiciary."
Simon Lazarus, counsel for the National
Senior Citizens Law Center, told the Times
that the Citizens United ruling came as a
"real shock" to the administration, which
"saw this new activist thrust among the
conservatives as a direct threat to their
legislative agenda."
Ever since Obama's State of the Union
remarks, Democrats and the White House
have moved aggressively to legislate a way
around the Citizens United ruling. The
Disclose Act legislation that the House
say is a thinly veiled attempt to regulate
corporate First Amendment speech so
heavily that it becomes impractical, is
unlikely to enhance the court's rapport with
the administration.
That the battle lines have been drawn is
clear. During the Kagan confirmation
hearings, for example, Sen. Sheldon
Whitehouse, D-R.I., warned of "the danger
of judicial activism," in reference to "the
recent behavior of the court, particularly the
five Republican appointees who've steered
it so hard to the right."
Curt Levey, executive director of The
Committee for Justice, a conservative
organization that has expressed serious
doubts about Kagan's ability to put the law
above politics, tells Newsmax that
allegations of judicial activism by
conservatives are purely political.
"Democratic senators' charges of activism
by the Roberts Court were remarkably free
of any legal rationale and amounted to little
more than complaining about outcomes they
don't like-that is, decisions that don't show
favoritism for the 'little guy.' Now that
judicial activism has gotten a well-earned
bad name, such that Democrats can no
longer openly defend it, they are reduced to
saying 'you do it too,' as we saw at the
Kagan hearings."
The Los Angeles Times reported Monday
that a number of legal scholars now consider
a clash between the expansive pro-
government plans of the Obama
administration and the Roberts court to be
inevitable.
On healthcare, for example, GOP leaders in
20 states have filed suit to block the
imposition of federal legislation that appears
recently passed, which conservative critics
to give short shrift to the states' role in
providing healthcare.
"Presidents with active agendas for change
almost always encounter resistance in the
courts," Stanford University law professor
Michael W. McConnell, a former appellate
court judge, told the Times. "It happened to
[Franklin D.] Roosevelt and it happened to
Reagan. It will likely happen to Obama too."
The Obama administration has already run
into a brick wall in various court venues
regarding its policies. Its setbacks, beyond
the Citizens United case, include:
* The administration's six-month
moratorium on offshore drilling was
blocked by a federal judge who
wrote that "the plaintiffs have
established a likelihood of showing
that the administration acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing
the moratorium." When the
administration tried to get a stay of
that judge's order, that pleading also
was rejected.
* In District of Columbia v. Heller, the
Supreme Court struck down by a 5-4
margin the ban on guns in
Washington, D.C. As solicitor
general, Kagan had argued that the
D.C. gun ban should continue.
" In June, by another 5-4 vote, the
court expanded the protections in
Heller to residents of all states,
striking down a gun ban in Chicago
as a violation of the Second
Amendment right to bear arms.
" The administration is soon expected
to go to court to try to block the
Arizona law that aims to enforce the
federal prohibitions on illegal
immigration. There has been
speculation the delay in the
administration's lawsuit stems from
its uncertainty over how to attack a
law that is largely patterned after
existing regulations that the federal
government has declined to enforce.
In part, the impending clash as the
administration pushes its agenda forward
appears to reflect the nation's growing
partisan divide.
In last week's confirmation hearings, Sen.
John Cornyn, R-Texas, pushed Kagan to
identify any area of economic activity that
the federal government, under the U.S.
Constitution, is not permitted to regulate.
Kagan declined, saying, "I wouldn't try to."
"It is not surprising that Kagan was reluctant
to provide an example of an economic
activity that Congress can't regulate under
the Constitution's Commerce Clause,"
Levey tells Newsmax. "To some degree, this
reflects the sorry state of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, in which the Supreme Court
has refused to enforce any meaningful limits
on Congress's enumerated powers.
"But Kagan also had something more
specific in mind," Levey says. "She was
clearly trying to keep her options open for
stretching the Commerce Clause wide
enough to allow her to uphold Obamacare's
individual insurance mandate."
"It Keeps Coming Down to
the Man in the Middle"
The Washington Post
March 15, 2009
Robert Barnes
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy has taken over
the Supreme Court. Again.
You thought you already knew that? It was
easy to get the impression from the flurry of
landmark decisions that flowed from the
court at the end of the term last summer.
Kennedy was the only justice in each
majority as the divided court ruled out the
death penalty for child-rapists, found in the
Second Amendment the individual right to a
firearm and provided constitutional
protections to the detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
But last year was something of a slump for
Kennedy. According to the folks at
Scotusblog.com, which keeps meticulous
records of such things, Kennedy prevailed in
"only" 86 percent of the cases.
The year before, as the court faced its first
full term with Chief Justice John G. Roberts
Jr. at the helm and Justice Samuel A. Alito
Jr. taking the seat vacated by Sandra Day
O'Connor, Kennedy became the essential
justice. He was on the losing side of only
two of the 72 cases the justices decided. He
was in the majority in every one of the 24
cases decided by a 5 to 4 vote.
So far this term, with the court announcing
decisions in about a third of its cases,
Kennedy has a perfect record.
The caveats: It's early. The court's most
divisive cases are yet to come. And much of
what the court has done so far is to get the
easy ones out of the way. Of the court's 28
decisions this term, justices have been
unanimous in the outcome 13 times.
Still, Roberts assigned Kennedy the task of
writing the plurality opinion when the
splintered court narrowed the scope of
what's required under the Voting Rights Act
when governments create electoral districts
to protect minority voters' rights.
And, with some of the court's most notable
decisions and arguments still to come,
Kennedy's impact will increase.
Although the tone of an oral argument is not
always predictive, few could have left the
court's recent consideration of whether a
West Virginia Supreme Court justice should
have recused himself in a matter involving a
campaign supporter thinking that Kennedy
would not decide the case.
Likewise, it is hard to imagine that Kennedy
will not play the key role in the court's
upcoming case on the constitutionality of the
linchpin of the Voting Rights Act, the
section that requires states with a history of
racial discrimination to get approval from
the federal government before changing
voting laws.
And there's one case on the docket that
practically belongs to Kennedy. It is about
the circumstances in which public school
systems must pay for the private schooling
of children with disabilities. Kennedy
recused himself when the court tried to
decide the issue before, and it split 4 to 4.
As is custom for the justices, Kennedy did
not say why he recused himself. But the
court has now accepted a case that presents a
virtually identical issue, and Kennedy will
apparently be back to cast the deciding vote.
"There's clearly a center on this court," says
Supreme Court practitioner Roy T. Englert
Jr., "and it consists of Justice Kennedy."
"Is the 'Kennedy Court' Over?"
The New York Times
July 15, 2010
Linda Greenhouse
A report in The Daily News last week that
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy has no plans to
retire left me shaking my head.
Would the next report be that the sun rose in
the east this morning? It never even
occurred to me to wonder whether Justice
Kennedy, who turns 74 next Friday, might
be thinking about retiring, because the
answer is so clearly no. The man obviously
still loves his job after 22 years, and has no
reason to leave it.
But thinking about Anthony Kennedy led
me to look back over the Supreme Court
term that ended last month, and what I found
surprised me. A plausible case can be made
that it is no longer the "Kennedy court."
That label has been applied to the Supreme
Court for the last few years, including by
me. It reflected the fact that on a polarized
court, with two blocs of four justices reliably
taking opposite sides in any case with a hint
of ideological content, the majority in
important cases turned out to be wherever
Justice Kennedy was. In the 2006-2007
term, the first full term after Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor's retirement, the court
decided 24 cases by votes of 5-to-4, and
Justice Kennedy was in the majority in all
24.
But during this past term, Justice Kennedy
was in dissent in 5 of the 18 cases decided
by five-vote majorities (a figure that
amounts to one-quarter of the 73 cases
decided with signed opinions, down from 31
percent in the previous term and 40 percent
in the term before that.) Three justices to
Justice Kennedy's right, Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr.,
all cast fewer dissenting votes in those close
cases (three, three and four, respectively)
and Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. was
tied with Justice Kennedy at five.
Those are admittedly fine distinctions from a
small sample, but I would argue that it's the
trend that counts. Justice Kennedy no longer
appears to reside at the court's center of
gravity. The center has shifted to the right.
(I should note here that while Supreme
Court statistics are widely available on the
Internet, including from the estimable
Scotusblog site, the numbers I use are my
own, and may not always agree with others'.
There are a surprising number of judgment
calls that go into Supreme Court vote-
counting, such as how to count a concurring
opinion that agrees with the particular
outcome-as Chief Justice Roberts did in a
case striking down life sentences without
parole for juvenile offenders convicted of
crimes other than murder-while rejecting
the rationale that the majority will apply in
future cases. After some pondering, I
decided to count the chief justice's vote in
that case, Graham v. Florida, as a dissent,
and to consider Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion as a 5-to-4 rather than 6-to-3 win for
the court's liberal bloc. I also count the
term's big patent case, Bilski v. Kappos, as
5-to-4 for its splintered reasoning, although
as a technical matter the judgment was 9-to-
0.)
Of course, what really counts is what Justice
Kennedy voted for and against. Of the 18
cases decided by five-member majorities, 12
can be considered at least somewhat
ideological. These included Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission, freeing
corporations and labor unions to spend
money on behalf of candidates in federal
elections; Berghuis v. Thompkins, making it
easier for the prosecution to show that a
suspect had waived his Miranda rights; and
Salazar v. Buono, enabling the government
to keep a Christian cross standing on top of
a hill on the Mojave National Preserve.
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinions
in all three of those cases. He voted a total
of 10 times with the conservative bloc in the
12 ideological cases. Compare that with the
previous term, during which he gave the
liberal bloc his vote in 5 of 17 close and
ideological cases; during the term before
that, 2007-2008, he voted fully half the time
in such cases with the liberals. This term, it
was only twice.
In one of those two cases, he wrote the
majority opinion declaring that a sentence of
life without parole for a juvenile convicted
of a non-homicide offense was categorically
unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. "Life in prison without
the possibility of parole gives no chance for
fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance
for reconciliation with society, no hope,"
Justice Kennedy wrote.
In the second case, he joined Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg's majority opinion
upholding a public law school's refusal to
grant official status to a student religious
group that excludes those who engage in
"unrepentant homosexual conduct." His
concurring opinion in that case, Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez, was in some
respects broader than Justice Ginsburg's
majority opinion. Justice Kennedy went
beyond the somewhat murky facts to give
his thoughts about life in law school, where
according to conscience, demean a person's
"speech is deemed persuasive based on its
substance, not the identity of the speaker."
He declared: "A vibrant dialogue is not
possible if students wall themselves off from
opposing points of view."
Those two opinions were vintage Anthony
Kennedy: he embraces whichever side he is
on with full rhetorical force. Much more
than Justice O'Connor, whose position at the
center of the court fell to him when she left,
Justice Kennedy tends to think in broad
categories. It has always seemed to me that
he divides the world, at least the world of
government action-which is what situates a
case in a constitutional framework-
between the fair and the not-fair.
Affirmative action policies are not fair-he
has never voted to uphold one-because, in
his view, they victimize those who bear no
fault, such as the white applicant with higher
test scores. Laws designed to bar gay men
and lesbians from achieving their goals
through the political process are not fair (he
wrote the majority opinion striking down
such a measure in a 1996 case, Romer v.
Evans) because "central both to the idea of
the rule of law and to our own Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection is the principle
that government and each of its parts remain
open on impartial terms to all who seek its
assistance." The restrictions on corporate
speech in the McCain-Feingold campaign
finance law were not fair because the First
Amendment does not abide discrimination
among speakers.
In a book titled "Justice Kennedy's
Jurisprudence," a political scientist, Frank J.
Colucci, wrote last year that Justice
Kennedy is animated by an "ideal of liberty"
that "independently considers whether
government actions have the effect of
preventing an individual from developing
his or her distinctive personality or acting
standing in the community, or violate
essential elements of human dignity." That
is, I think, a more academically elegant way
of saying fair versus not-fair.
So the challenge for anyone arguing to
Justice Kennedy in the courtroom, or with
him as a colleague in the conference room,
would seem to be to persuade him to see
your case on the fair (or not-fair, depending)
side of the line. Maybe as a justice Elena
Kagan will be able to work her magic as she
did with the fractious Harvard Law School
faculty. But a junior justice, unlike a law
school dean, has no inducements to offer,
and Justice Kennedy is a tough man to
persuade, as other justices have learned.
The notion of a "Kennedy court" rested on
the assumption that Justice Kennedy's vote
was in play, at least most of the time, that
the boundary separating liberals and
conservatives on the court was at least
theoretically permeable and that he was
willing to cross it. If that is no longer, or
hardly ever, the case, then whose court is it?
Here is a final set of numbers suggesting
that the most accurate description of the
Supreme Court today is that it is a court
securely in the collective hands of its five
most conservative members. Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito
and Kennedy collectively dissented during
the past term a grand total of only 39 times,
averaging 7.8 dissents per justice over the
course of a term that produced 73 decisions.
The four others-Justices Ginsburg, Stephen
G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens and Sonia
Sotomayor--dissented 78 times, for an
average of 19.5 dissenting votes per justice.
Of course Justice Kennedy isn't going to
retire-not when he is on the winning team.
"Roberts Court Protects the Powerful"
Politico
May 5, 2010
Nan Aron
As chief justice, John Roberts has shown a
strong pro-business tilt. On the eve of the
appointment of a replacement for Justice
John Paul Stevens, the stakes have never
been clearer.
The Roberts court has repeatedly placed
corporate interests first and the rights of
individuals second, as shown by an in-depth
analysis that we just completed,
"Unprecedented Injustice: The Political
Agenda of the Roberts Court." In many
cases, this court has disregarded precedents
and long-held principles to do so.
For those who care about unchecked
corporate power, personal freedoms and
respect for judicial precedent, the picture
revealed by our data isn't pretty. The record
shows that the Roberts court consistently
protects the powerful at the expense of the
rest of us.
In the 2006-07 term, for example, the
Roberts court heard 30 business-related
cases and at least 22-or 73 percent-were
decided in favor of large corporations.
A litany of cases heard by the Roberts court,
and often decided by 5-4 votes,
demonstrates this rightward, pro-Big
Business tilt-an approach that will
certainly continue, even after a replacement
for Stevens has been seated.
According to our analysis, these cases
include:
0 A consumer seriously injured by a
defective medical device cannot sue the
manufacturer if the product was approved by
federal government regulators-even if the
company knew the product was dangerous.
- Exxon was allowed to escape full financial
liability for the damage done to communities
and the environment by the Exxon Valdez
oil spill.
- Two decisions that left many waterways no
longer protected by the Clean Water Act,
resulting in 1,500 major pollution
investigations being halted and a 50 percent
reduction in EPA actions against water
polluters.
- Corporations have the same constitutional
right to free speech as ordinary citizens,
which opened the floodgates of unlimited
corporate spending in federal elections.
- A woman paid less than her male peers for
20 years had no right to bring a lawsuit for
equal pay because she failed to file the suit
within 180 days of the first instance of
discrimination-though she had no way of
learning about the discrimination until years
later.
But this pro-Big Business tilt demonstrated
in our research is just one part of the story. It
seems clear that many Republicans, perhaps
prodded by their corporate allies, are
herding key programs of the post-New Deal
era toward the front door of the Supreme
Court.
With a court that appears so casual about
breaking precedent (see Citizens United v.
FEC and Lilly Ledbetter v. Goodyear), it
could be that the right wing is hoping that
the slender five-member conservative
majority might dismantle everything from
Social Security and Medicare, to privacy
and civil rights, to environmental and
consumer protections.
In this manner, the Roberts court may be
called on to undo what otherwise can't be
undone by the legislative process.
For example, just look at the federal lawsuits
against the health care reform bill filed by
21 Republican state attorneys general. It
could well be that the conservative
movement wants to use the court as the
judicial arm of a political agenda.
Given the fact that, in the past 40 years, 11
out of 14 confirmed justices were appointed
by Republicans, conservatives may have
good reason to be confident.
The big question then becomes: Will this
court play along?
Some argue that the Supreme Court rarely
strays too far from the centerline of
American society and that core programs
and broadly held social values will
ultimately be safe. But clearly, this
conservative majority is frequently willing
to stray from the mainstream judicial path.
Given the stark reality our research reveals,
we are concerned about the future. But
we're also convinced that some measure of
change can occur even without the ability to
replace a conservative justice with a more
progressive one.
With so much at stake, we are confident that
the president will appoint someone
committed to core constitutional values,
willing and able to stand up to the narrow
conservative majority with clearly
articulated principles.
This new justice must also
occasionally break through
common ground.
be able to
and find
When so many decisions are decided with
knife-edge majorities, the need to bring that
fifth vote back to the side of fundamental
constitutional principles, respect for
precedent and a more appropriate balance
between corporate and individual rights has
never been more important.
Generations of social and economic progress
hang in the balance.
"Heart of Darkness?"
Newsweek
September 24, 2009
Dahlia Lithwick
Next week the Supreme Court will begin its
2009 term, secure in the knowledge that it
remains completely misunderstood by the
American public. A Gallup poll conducted
in September showed the court's current
approval rating-61 percent-to be higher
than it's been in a decade. (Last year that
number was 50 percent.) This fall, 50
percent of Americans believe the court is not
too liberal or too conservative; that's up
from 43 percent last year. The number of
Americans who believe the court is too
conservative has dropped from 30 to 19
percent.
All this public admiration for the court's
moderation came the same week the court
was hearing a campaign-finance-reform case
that may dismantle a longstanding system of
campaign-finance restrictions. The issue in
Citizens United v. Federal Elections
Commission is not limited to the
constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold
campaign-finance-reform law. The reason
court watchers got so worked up about this
case is that it squarely tests Chief Justice
John Roberts's stated commitments to
preserving precedent, deferring to the
elected branches, and issuing narrow rulings
instead of sweeping ones. Oral arguments
revealed that the court's five conservatives
feel nothing but contempt for campaign-
finance regulations that demonize
corporations, restrict core political speech,
and-to quote the chief justice-"put our
First Amendment rights in the hands of FEC
bureaucrats."
But that's where the public confusion kicks
in. In last term's cases on voting rights,
reverse discrimination, and a school strip
search, the court opted for narrow, case-
specific rulings rather than the sweeping
ones foreshadowed by dramatic oral
arguments. All this hardly means the 2008
term was a triumph for liberals at the high
court. On balance, the term continued a clear
trend in which big business always prevails,
environmentalists are always buried, female
and elderly workers go unprotected, death-
row inmates get the needle, and criminal
defendants are shown the door. So how to
explain these new poll numbers showing
that 49 percent of Republicans believe the
Roberts Court is too liberal and 59 percent
of Democrats believe the court is "about
right"?
In part, the numbers reflect a focus on the
wrong data; we continue to believe in the
court we see on TV. Thus, the highly
charged confirmation hearings of Justice
Sonia Sotomayor this summer contributed to
the idea that the court was swinging
leftward, even though it's clear that her
substitution for Justice David Souter will do
nothing to alter the balance of the court
(indeed, she is generally expected to move
the court to the right in some areas of
criminal law). Similarly, the refusal of the
court to go all the way in the big-banner
civil-rights cases last year leads to the broad
perception that the court is quite liberal.
To be sure, progressives who claim that the
court's eventual ruling in September's
campaign-finance fracas will conclusively
reveal the heart of darkness that lurks inside
the Roberts Court are also overstating their
case. It's true that the Roberts Court is a
fundamentally conservative creature and
will remain that way for the foreseeable
future. But as we learned yet again last term,
it's also a court that is deeply aware of, even
responsive to, public opinion. This is a court
willing to reverse the Warren revolution
with a tablespoon instead of a wrecking ball,
and that may be too nuanced an approach to
be captured in public-opinion polls.
The term that opens next week promises to
provide another fistful of cases that will
slowly deepen our understanding of the
Roberts Court. Among them: yet another
challenge to a cross on government property
(raising questions about who has standing to
be offended by religious symbols); a dispute
over the constitutionality of a federal statute
criminalizing depictions of animal cruelty;
questions about whether juveniles may be
sentenced to life without parole; another hot
eminent-domain case; and maybe even a
quarrel over whether the name "Washington
Redskins" is offensive. If the tea leaves are
correct, we may also see another
confirmation hearing next summer.
As a generation raised on a constant diet of
reality television and the inevitable "big
reveal," we will continue to look to the high
drama of oral argument and the staged
fireworks of judicial-confirmation hearings
for our views about the Supreme Court.
What really happens at the high court in the
coming years will continue to occur by the
tablespoon-even if we are too busy with
imagined wrecking balls to see it.
"Three Supreme Court Myths"
National Journal
April 16, 2010
Stuart Taylor Jr.
At both ends of the ideological spectrum,
politicians, activists, journalists, and
academics like to stress how big a change
the next Supreme Court justice could make
in the course of the law. The appointment
will, says the conventional wisdom, be
among President Obama's most important
legacies.
Many also stress how far to the right (say
liberals) or left (say conservatives) of center
the Supreme Court has been in recent years,
the better to dramatize the need to correct
the perceived imbalance.
And the dominant media image has been of
"the conservative Court" (recent articles in
the Washington Post), or "the Supreme
Court's conservative majority" (New York
Times editorials), or a Court "as
conservative as it's been in nearly a century"
(Newsweek commentary by my friend
Dahlia Lithwick).
All this brings to mind three contrarian
theses.
First, it simply won't make much difference
in the next five or so years-if ever-whom
Obama picks from the lists of moderately
liberal, extremely liberal, and just plain
liberal candidates leaked by the White
House.
Indeed, I can't think of a single case or issue
that would foreseeably be decided
differently depending on whether the
nominee turns out to be the most or the least
liberal of those under serious consideration.
The Court is by nature quite stable. Imagine,
for example, that Obama nominated and the
Senate confirmed a person more liberal than
either John Paul Stevens or any other current
justice. No matter how passionate, or how
brilliant, or how persuasive, he or she could
move the law no further than at least four
others were willing to go. And given the
justices' fierce independence, it's hard to
imagine any of them lurching leftward at the
urging of the new kid on the block.
The eventual impact of the next justice's
ideology will depend on unpredictable
developments, including how many allies he
or she might gain from future appointments
and how his or her own views might evolve,
both on today's big issues and on issues that
will emerge later.
Indeed, history suggests that an appointee is
likely to make a dramatic difference only
when three ingredients are present: 1) The
president is liberal and the outgoing justice
is conservative, or vice versa; 2) the Court is
very closely divided along liberal-
conservative lines; and 3) the president can
get a strong proponent of his own ideology
through the Senate.
The first ingredient is not present now
because Obama and Stevens are both liberal.
The first two ingredients were present in
1987, with the retirement of moderate
Justice Lewis Powell, who had been the
balance-tipping vote. President Reagan
named Robert Bork, who was poised to
provide the fifth vote to overrule Roe v.
Wade and other major liberal precedents.
But the Senate rejected him.
That led to the appointment of Justice
Anthony Kennedy, who now occupies the
same balance-tipping position that Powell
once did. Kennedy was far less conservative
than Bork, as he showed by reaffirming Roe
in 1992 (with some trimming). Kennedy
also proved to be more liberal than Powell
on some big issues. That helps explain why
during Kennedy's time the Court has moved
to the left-although you'd hardly know it
from most media portrayals-on national
security, gay rights, the death penalty, and
church-state issues.
The only time in the past 35 years that all
three ingredients for a balance-tipping
appointment have been present was 2005.
The retirement of moderate-liberal Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor allowed President
Bush to move the Court to the right-but not
so far as to fit the "conservative Court"
caricature-by nominating the solidly
conservative Samuel Alito, who was
confirmed in 2006.
(Bush's 2005 appointment of John Roberts
to succeed William Rehnquist as chief
justice did not substantially change the
Court's balance.)
This brings me to my second contrarian
thesis: Despite complaints by both liberal
and conservative critics, the Court has not
strayed far from mainstream public opinion
over the past 35 years.
The need to get the support of both the
president and the Senate tends to screen out
candidates with extreme views. And the
Supreme Court does follow the election
returns, as humorist Finley Peter Dunne's
Mr. Dooley observed. Polls, too.
Indeed, no decision since Roe in 1973-not
even Bush v. Gore-has produced a lasting
public backlash. And that one was a surprise
to the justices.
My third contrarian thesis is that although
Alito did make the Court more conservative
on some big issues, we have not had a
consistently "conservative Court" since
1937. Indeed, since the 1970s, the Court has
strayed more often to the left than to the
right of center of public opinion. And it
remains as liberal as ever on some big
issues, if only by a one-vote margin.
Here's a brief issue-by-issue analysis,
updating a more detailed commentary that I
posted last June 16.
* National security. In three big cases
involving Guantanamo detainees since 2004,
the four liberals plus Kennedy (and
O'Connor in the 2004 case) have pushed the
judiciary deeper into second-guessing the
political branches' national security policies
than ever before, by sweeping aside both
presidential orders and a major 2006 act of
Congress. Polls suggest lopsided public
disapproval.
- Abortion. Polls have shown for many
years that although the public does not want
Roe v. Wade overruled, majorities say that
abortion should be legal in, at most, "only a
few circumstances" and support restrictions
that the four liberals and Kennedy have
struck down. These include banning
abortions in the second and third trimesters
and requiring spousal notification. Kennedy
did join the four conservatives in 2007 in
upholding a federal ban on "partial-birth"
abortion that O'Connor would have struck
down, a decision that enjoyed overwhelming
public support.
- Religion. Polls have consistently shown
strong approval of the nondenominational,
nonparticipatory types of school prayer
outside the classroom setting that the liberals
plus Kennedy and O'Connor struck down
over conservative dissents in 1992 and 2000.
• Death penalty. The four liberals and
Kennedy have banned the death penalty for
murderers who were mentally disabled or
younger than 18 and for child-rapists. These
decisions-the last of which candidate
Barack Obama denounced in 2008-put the
justices somewhat to the left of public
opinion.
- Gay rights. Although a solid majority of
the public believes that sexual relations
between consenting gay adults should be
legal, polls showed that many thought the
four liberals and Kennedy had gone too far,
too fast when they made gay sex a
constitutional right in 2003. Roberts and
Alito have yet to face a gay-rights case.
- Gun rights. The June 2008 decision by the
Court's conservatives and Kennedy striking
down the District of Columbia's complete
ban on handguns was an unprecedented
interpretation of the Second Amendment.
But it was also consistent with the
overwhelming public support for an
individual right to keep and bear arms-and
was applauded by Obama.
* Federal power. Conservatives plan to
argue during the coming confirmation
proceedings that the health care overhaul's
mandate to buy insurance or pay a penalty
tax exceeds Congress's constitutional
powers. It is not yet clear whether Alito and
Roberts would be more receptive to such
claims than O'Connor and Rehnquist.
- Race. This is the biggest issue on which
Alito appears to have made the Court
markedly more conservative than it had
been. In a 2007 decision striking down race-
based student assignments-which would
almost certainly have gone the other way
had O'Connor stayed on-the four
conservatives came close to adopting an
absolutist "colorblind Constitution" stance
that would doom racial preferences.
Kennedy didn't go as far, but has generally
opposed racial preferences-as has the
public, by wide margins.
- Campaign finance regulation. In striking
down on January 21 all limits on
independent election spending by
corporations and (apparently) unions, the
five-justice majority moved dramatically to
the right not only of its own precedents but
also of public opinion, which was
overwhelmingly negative. This was big.
Whether it foreshadows bigger things to
come is unclear.
Democrats are trying to leverage public
disapproval of this and other decisions into a
populist backlash against justices who
"always seems to side with the big corporate
interests against the average American," in
the words of Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Patrick Leahy. Lest mere
exaggeration fall short of galvanizing the
public, Leahy, Obama, and many in the
media have added a large dose of distortion.
The reality is that although Alito has moved
the law to the right on some issues, the
Court still has five solid liberal votes on
others, thanks to Kennedy's ideological
eclecticism. The same will almost certainly
be true when the dust clears after this
summer's confirmation vote.
"Our Fill-in-the-Blank Constitution"
The New York Times
April 13, 2010
Geoffrey R. Stone
As the Senate awaits the nomination of a
new Supreme Court justice, a frank
discussion is needed on the proper role of
judges in our constitutional system. For 30
years, conservative commentators have
persuaded the public that conservative
judges apply the law, whereas liberal judges
make up the law. According to Chief Justice
John Roberts, his job is just to "call balls
and strikes." According to Justice Antonin
Scalia, conservative jurists merely carry out
the "original meaning" of the framers. These
are appealing but wholly disingenuous
descriptions of what judges-liberal or
conservative-actually do.
To see why this is so, we need only look to
the text of the Constitution. It defines our
most fundamental rights and protections in
open-ended terms: "freedom of speech," for
example, and "equal protection of the laws,"
"due process of law," "unreasonable
searches and seizures," "free exercise" of
religion and "cruel and unusual
punishment." These terms are not self-
defining; they did not have clear meanings
even to the people who drafted them. The
framers fully understood that they were
leaving it to future generations to use their
intelligence, judgment and experience to
give concrete meaning to the expressed
aspirations.
Rulings by conservative justices in the past
decade make it perfectly clear that they do
not "apply the law" in a neutral and
detached manner. Consider, for example,
their decisions holding that corporations
have the same right of free speech as
individuals, that commercial advertising
receives robust protection under the First
Amendment, that the Second Amendment
prohibits the regulation of guns, that
affirmative action is unconstitutional, that
the equal protection clause mandated the
election of George W. Bush and that the
Boy Scouts have a First Amendment right to
exclude gay scoutmasters.
Whatever one thinks of these decisions, it
should be apparent that conservative judges
do not disinterestedly call balls and strikes.
Rather, fueled by their own political and
ideological convictions, they make value
judgments, often in an aggressively activist
manner that goes well beyond anything the
framers themselves envisioned. There is
nothing simple, neutral, objective or
restrained about such decisions. For too
long, conservatives have set the terms of the
debate about judges, and they have done so
in a highly misleading way. Americans
should see conservative constitutional
jurisprudence for what it really is. And
liberals must stand up for their vision of the
judiciary
So, how should judges interpret the
Constitution? To answer that question, we
need to consider why we give courts the
power of judicial review-the power to hold
laws unconstitutional-in the first place.
Although the framers thought democracy to
be the best system of government, they
recognized that it was imperfect. One flaw
that troubled them was the risk that
prejudice or intolerance on the part of the
majority might threaten the liberties of a
minority. As James Madison observed, in a
democratic society "the real power lies in
the majority of the community, and the
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be
apprehended . .. from acts in which the
major number of the constituents." It was
therefore essential, Madison concluded, for
judges, whose life tenure insulates them
from the demands of the majority, to serve
as the guardians of our liberties and as "an
impenetrable bulwark" against every
encroachment upon our most cherished
freedoms.
Conservative judges often stand this idea on
its head. As the list of rulings above shows,
they tend to exercise the power of judicial
review to invalidate laws that disadvantage
corporations, business interests, the wealthy
and other powerful interests in society. They
employ judicial review to protect the
powerful rather than the powerless.
Liberal judges, on the other hand, have
tended to exercise the power of judicial
review to invalidate laws that disadvantage
racial and religious minorities, political
dissenters, people accused of crimes and
others who are unlikely to have their
interests fully and fairly considered by the
majority. Liberal judges have ended racial
segregation, recognized the principle of "one
person, one vote," prohibited censorship of
the Pentagon Papers and upheld the right to
due process, even at Guantdnamo Bay. This
approach to judicial review fits much more
naturally with the concerns and intentions of
people like Madison who forged the
American constitutional system.
Should "empathy" enter into this process? In
the days before he nominated Sonia
Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, President
Obama was criticized by conservatives for
suggesting that a sense of empathy might
make for a better judge.
But the president was correct. If all judges
did was umpire, then judicial empathy
would be irrelevant. In baseball, we
government is the mere instrument of the
wouldn't want an umpire to say a ball was a
strike just because he felt empathy for the
pitcher. But once you understand that the
umpire analogy is absurd, it's evident that a
sense of empathy can, in fact, help judges
fulfill their responsibilities-in at least two
ways.
First, empathy helps judges understand the
aspirations of the framers, who were
themselves determined to protect the rights
of political, religious, racial and other
minorities. Second, it helps judges
understand the effects of the law on the real
world. Think of judicial decisions that have
invalidated laws prohibiting interracial
marriage, granted hearings to welfare
recipients before their benefits could be
terminated, forbidden forced sterilization of
people accused of crime, protected the rights
of political dissenters and members of
minority religious faiths, guaranteed a right
to counsel for indigent defendants and
invalidated laws denying women equal
rights under the law. In each of these
situations, in order to give full and proper
meaning to the Constitution it was necessary
and appropriate for the justices to
comprehend the, effect that the laws under
consideration had, or could have, on the
lives of real people.
Faithfully applying our Constitution's 18th-
and 19th-century text to 21st-century
problems requires not only careful attention
to the text, fidelity to the framers' goals and
respect for precedent, but also an awareness
of the practical realities of the present. Only
with such awareness can judges, in a
constantly changing society, hope to keep
faith with our highest law.
This does not mean judges are free to make
up the law as they go along. But it does
mean that constitutional law is not a
mechanical exercise of just "applying the
law." Before there can be a serious national
dialogue about our Constitution, our laws
and the proper role of our judges, that myth
must be exposed.
"Campaign Case May Have
Set Course for Court"
USA Today
February 8, 2010
Joan Biskupic
As the Supreme Court nears the midpoint of
its annual term and prepares to hear several
momentous cases, one question looms: Will
the justices' split decision reversing past
rulings and allowing new corporate
spending in political races set the tone for
the term, or will Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission be an exception?
"Is this a turning point?" asks Pamela
Harris, director of Georgetown Law's
Supreme Court Institute. Harris notes that
Chief Justice John Roberts' concurring
opinion in the campaign-finance case
defended reversing past rulings that have
been, as Roberts wrote, "so hotly contested
that (they) cannot reliably function as a basis
for decision in future cases."
"That is an incredibly muscular vision of
when you would overrule precedent," which
usually guides justices in new cases, Harris
says. "That makes it look like this is a court
that's ready to go."
Several pending cases-some that already
have been argued, some that will be argued
in upcoming weeks-are likely to show the
reach of the Roberts Court and its boldness.
Temple University law professor David
Kairys expects the Citizens United to
distinguish the Roberts Court for years. "I
think it will actually define more than this
particular term," he says. "It might define
the Roberts Court."
Among the most closely watched disputes:
whether the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms covers regulation by
states and cities; whether people who signed
petitions for a ballot referendum against gay
marriage have a First Amendment right to
keep their names private; and whether a
board set up to regulate public accounting
firms after the Enron and Worldcom
scandals violates the separation of powers
and infringes on the executive branch.
That last case, Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, could challenge the legal consensus
that Congress has the power to establish and
set rules for certain independent agencies
and their members within the executive
branch. Some conservatives, including
Justice Antonin Scalia, have argued in some
situations that only the president can remove
executive officials.
Big cases ahead
Citizens United reinforced the court's
caustic ideological divide and may have
signaled what's to come in the nearly 70
cases that await resolution through July.
The same acrimonious split was seen earlier
in January when the five-justice
conservative majority-Roberts, Scalia and
Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence
Thomas and Samuel Alito-blocked
broadcast of a federal trial in San Francisco
on the constitutionality of California's ban
on same-sex marriage.
Dissenting were the same four who
protested in Citizens United: Justices John
Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen
Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor.
The majority in the dispute over Proposition
8-the 2008 voter initiative that banned gay
marriage-said lower-court judges failed to
follow procedures for notifying the public
about the potential broadcasts, and it
accepted arguments that the broadcasts
could lead to the harassment of witnesses
who had supported the same-sex marriage
ban.
Dissenters countered that "the public interest
weighs in favor of providing access to the
courts" and accused the majority of
"extraordinary intervention" in local affairs.
Kairys sees the current majority as the most
conservative in decades. "It really is their
time. They seem to have this undercurrent
of, 'Let's do the things we want to do while
we're in control."'
President Obama appointed Sotomayor last
year and may get another appointment or
two. But the Democratic president's
nominees would likely succeed liberals, who
are among the older members of this bench.
Stevens will turn 90 in April, Ginsburg 77 in
March. Roberts, who is 55, and his fellow
conservatives are generally the younger
justices.
Accusations of activism
Of the 11 signed opinions the court has
issued for the term, Citizens United was the
most consequential.
Kairys argues that because of how money
shapes politics, Citizens United marks "a
change in the whole system of democracy."
Notre Dame law professor Richard Garnett
is among analysts who see it as having less
of an impact.
"Citizens United did not really dramatically
change the presence of 'corporate' money in
politics," he says. "It was there before, and
always will be, for better or worse."
Yet Gamett is watching pending
constitutional cases.
In Stevens' dissent in Citizens United, he
referred to the "majority's agenda" and
strongly suggested the majority was not
"serious about judicial restraint."
Roberts, who said during his confirmation
hearings in 2005 that his job would be "to
call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat,"
defended himself against criticism of
conservative activism.
The chief justice cited what he saw as flaws
in past campaign-finance cases that needed
to be addressed and wrote, "There is a
difference between judicial restraint and
judicial abdication."
"Roberts versus Roberts"
The New Republic
March 2, 2010
Jeffrey Rosen
Last month, the Supreme Court handed
down its most polarizing decision since
Bush v. Gore. The 5-4 ruling in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission
called into question decades of federal
campaign finance law and Supreme Court
precedents by finding that corporations have
a First Amendment right to spend as much
money as they want on election campaigns,
as long as they don't consult the candidates.
It was precisely the kind of divisive and
unnecessarily sweeping opinion that Chief
Justice John Roberts had once pledged to
avoid.
In 2006, at the end of his first term on the
Court, Roberts told me and others that he
was concerned that his colleagues, in issuing
5-4 opinions divided along predictable lines,
were acting more like law professors than
members of a collegial court. His goal, he
said, was to persuade his fellow justices to
converge around narrow, unanimous
opinions, as his greatest predecessor, John
Marshall, had done. Roberts spoke about the
need for justices to show humility when
dealing with the First Amendment, adding
that, unlike professors writing law review
articles, judges should think more about
their institutional role. "Yes, you may have
another great idea about how to look at the
First Amendment," he said, "but, if you
don't need to share it to decide this case,
then why are you doing it? And what are the
consequences of that going to be?"
Since then, Roberts has presided over some
narrow, unanimous (or nearly unanimous)
rulings and some bitterly divisive ones. And
so, it's been hard to tell how seriously he is
taking his pledge to lead the Court toward
less polarizing decisions. Then came
Citizens United, by far the clearest test of
Roberts's vision. There were any number of
ways he could have persuaded his
colleagues to rule narrowly; but Roberts
rejected these options. He deputized
Anthony Kennedy to write one of his
characteristically grandiose decisions,
challenging the president and Congress at a
moment of financial crisis when the
influence of money in politics-Louis
Brandeis called it "our financial
oligarchy"-is the most pressing question of
the day. The result was a ruling so
inflammatory that the president
(appropriately) criticized it during his State
of the Union address.
What all this says about the future of the
Roberts Court is not encouraging. For the
past few years, I've been giving Roberts the
benefit of the doubt, hoping that he meant it
when he talked about the importance of
putting the bipartisan legitimacy of the
Court above his own ideological agenda.
But, while Roberts talked persuasively about
conciliation, it now appears that he is
unwilling to cede an inch to liberals in the
most polarizing cases. If Roberts continues
this approach, the Supreme Court may find
itself on a collision course with the Obama
administration-precipitating the first full-
throttle confrontation between an
economically progressive president and a
narrow majority of conservative judicial
activists since the New Deal.
The first indications that Roberts might not
be as conciliatory as he promised came
during his second term, which ended in
2007. During his first term, which his
colleagues treated as something of a
honeymoon, the Court had decided just 13
percent of cases by a 5-4 margin. But, in the
next term, that percentage soared to 33
percent. (It would fluctuate up and down a
bit over the next two years.) What's more,
the 2007 term ended with unusually personal
invective, as both liberal and conservative
colleagues expressed frustration with
Roberts. That year, during the Court's
second encounter with the McCain-Feingold
campaign finance law (which it would gut in
Citizens United), Antonin Scalia accused
Roberts of "faux judicial restraint," for
chipping away at restrictions on corporate
speech without overturning them cleanly.
Meanwhile, the liberal justices seemed
angry that Roberts was refusing to budge
from rigid positions in divisive cases. "Of
course, I got slightly exercised, and the way
I show that is I write seventy-seven-page
opinions," Justice Stephen Breyer told me in
the summer of 2007, referring to his angry
dissent from Roberts's 5-4 decision striking
down affirmative action in public school
assignments.
That same summer, I asked Justice John
Paul Stevens whether Roberts would
succeed in his goal of achieving narrow,
unanimous opinions. "I don't think so," he
replied. "I just think it takes nine people to
do that. I think maybe the first few months
we all leaned over backward to try to avoid
writing separately." In other words, once his
first term ended, Roberts faced a choice: In
cases he cared intensely about, he could
compromise his principles to reach common
ground or he could stick to his guns and
infuriate his opponents, who would feel they
had been played for dupes. On virtually all
of the most divisive constitutional topics,
from affirmative action to partial-birth
abortion, Roberts stuck to his guns.
There were some exceptions. Roberts
managed to steer the Court toward narrow,
often unanimous opinions in business cases,
which now represent 40 percent of the
Court's docket. (Though this didn't require
him to significantly compromise his views,
since most of these cases were decided in a
pro-business direction.) And then, there was
last term's voting-rights case, in which
Roberts wrote an 8-1 decision rejecting a
broad constitutional challenge to the Voting
Rights Act and instead deciding the case on
technical grounds. For those who wanted to
believe that Roberts was a genuine
conciliator, this was a powerful piece of
evidence. Like others, I praised his
performance in the case as an act of judicial
statesmanship.
But, in retrospect, the ruling may have been
less statesmanlike than it appeared.
According to a source who was briefed on
the deliberations in the case, Anthony
Kennedy was initially ready to join Roberts
and the other conservatives in issuing a
sweeping 5-4 decision, striking down the
Voting Rights Act on constitutional grounds.
But the four liberal justices threatened to
write a strong dissent that would have
accused the majority of misconstruing
landmark precedents about congressional
power. What happened next is unclear, but
the most likely possibilities are either that
Kennedy got cold feet or that Roberts
backed down. The Voting Rights Act
survived, but what looked from the outside
like an act of judicial statesmanship by
Roberts may have in fact been a strategic
retreat. Moreover, rather than following the
principled alternative suggested by David
Souter at the oral argument-holding that
the people who were challenging the Voting
Rights Act had no standing to bring the
lawsuit-Roberts opted to rewrite the statute
in a way that Congress never intended. That
way, Roberts was still able to express his
constitutional doubts about the law-as well
as his doubts about landmark Supreme Court
precedents from the civil rights era, which
he mischaracterized and seemed ready to
overrule.
The voting-fights case may help explain
why Roberts didn't take a similarly
conciliatory posture in Citizens United.
After all, one was certainly available. Just as
Roberts had implausibly but strategically
held in the voting-rights case that Congress
intended to let election districts bail out of
federal supervision, he could have held-far
more plausibly-in Citizens United that
Congress never intended to regulate video-
on-demand or groups with minimal
corporate funding. As with the voting-rights
case, judicial creativity could have been
justified in the name of judicial restraint.
There is, of course, a charitable explanation
for why Roberts took the conciliatory
approach in one case but not the other:
namely, that he felt the principles involved
in Citizens United were somehow more
important and therefore less amenable to
compromise. As he told me in our 2006
interview, he has strong views that he, like
his hero John Marshall, is not willing to
bargain away. Marshall, Roberts said, "was
not going to compromise his principles, and
I don't think there's any example of his
doing that in his jurisprudence."
But a less charitable explanation for the
difference between the two cases is that
Roberts didn't compromise on Citizens
United because, this time, he simply didn't
have to. Kennedy was willing to write a
sweeping opinion that mischaracterized the
landmark precedent Buckley v. Valeo by
suggesting that it was concerned only about
quid pro quo corruption rather than less
explicit forms of undue influence on the
electoral system. (Congress had come to the
opposite conclusion in extensive fact-finding
that Kennedy ignored.) As Stevens pointed
out in his powerful dissent, the opinion is
aggressively activist in its willingness to
twist and overturn precedents, strike down
decades of federal law, and mischaracterize
the original understanding of the First
Amendment on the rights of corporations.
"The only relevant thing that has changed"
since the Court's first encounter with
McCain-Feingold in 2003, Stevens wrote,
"is the composition of this Court"-namely,
the arrival of Roberts and Samuel Alito.
Some of Roberts's liberal colleagues have
suggested that Roberts is a very nice man
but that he doesn't listen to opposing
arguments and can't be persuaded to change
his mind in controversial cases. If so, he
may have thought he could produce a
unanimous court by convincing liberals to
come around to his side, rather than by
meeting them halfway. In the most revealing
passage in his concurrence in Citizens
United, he wrote that "we cannot embrace a
narrow ground of decision simply because it
is narrow; it must also be right." But the
great practitioners of judicial restraint had a
very different perspective. "A Constitution
is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory," Oliver Wendell Holmes
wrote in his most famous dissent, in Lochner
v. New York. "It is made for people of
fundamentally differing views." Holmes
always deferred to the president and
Congress in the face of uncertainty. He
would never have presumed that he knew
the "right" answer in a case where people of
good faith could plausibly disagree.
With Roberts apparently content to impose
bold decisions on a divided nation on the
basis of slim majorities, the question
becomes: Is the Court now on the verge of
repeating the error it made in the 1930s?
Then, another 5-4 conservative majority
precipitated a presidential backlash by
striking down parts of FDR's New Deal. In
January 1937, Roosevelt also criticized the
Supreme Court's conservative activism in a
State of the Union address. The following
99
month, he introduced his court-packing plan.
But, at the end of March-thanks to the
famous "switch in time" by swing justice
Owen Roberts, the Anthony Kennedy of his
day-the Court retreated and began to
uphold New Deal laws.
One lesson from the 1930s is that it takes
only a handful of flamboyant acts of judicial
activism for the Court to be tarred in the
public imagination as partisan, even if the
justices themselves think they are being
moderate and judicious. Although vilified
today for their conservative activism, both
the Progressive and New Deal-era Courts
had nuanced records, upholding more
progressive laws than they struck down. As
Barry Cushman of the University of Virginia
notes, of the 20 cases involving maximum
working hours that the Court decided during
the Progressive era, there were only two in
which the Court struck down the
regulations. But those two are the ones that
everyone remembers. And, during the New
Deal era, Cushman adds, we remember the
cases striking down the National Industrial
Recovery Act and the first Agricultural
Adjustment Act, forgetting that the Court
upheld the centerpiece of FDR's monetary
policy and, by a vote of 8-1, the Tennessee
Valley Authority.
It's hard to imagine a full-scale assault by
the Roberts Court on Obama's regulatory
agenda because, with the exception of
Clarence Thomas, the conservatives on
today's Court tend to be pro-business
conservatives, rather than libertarian
conservatives, and are therefore unlikely to
strike down government spending programs
(like the bank bailouts and the Troubled
Asset Relief Program) that help U.S.
business. But it's not hard to imagine the
four conservative horsemen, joined by the
vacillating Kennedy, reversing other
government actions that progressives care
about. Later this term, for example, the
Court may follow Citizens United with
another activist decision, striking down the
Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (nicknamed "Peek-a-Boo"), which
was created to regulate accounting firm
auditors in the wake of the Enron and Arthur
Andersen scandals. If the Court strikes down
Peek-a-Boo, even if the decision is narrow
enough not to call into question the
constitutionality of the Federal Reserve, it
may provoke another sharp rejoinder from
Obama that turns progressive rumbling
against the Court into full-blown outrage.
It's impossible, at the moment, to tell
whether the reaction to Citizens United will
be the beginning of a torrential backlash or
will fade into the ether. But John Roberts is
now entering politically hazardous territory.
Without being confident either way, I still
hope that he has enough political savvy and
historical perspective to recognize and avoid
the shoals ahead. There's little doubt,
however, that the success or failure of his
tenure will turn on his ability to align his
promises of restraint with the reality of his
performance. Roberts may feel just as
confident that he knows the "right" answer
in cases like Peek-a-Boo as he did in
Citizens United. But political backlashes are
hard to predict, contested constitutional
visions can't be successfully imposed by 5-4
majorities, and challenging the president and
Congress on matters they care intensely
about is a dangerous game. We've seen
well-intentioned but unrestrained chief
justices overplay their hands in the past-
and it always ends badly for the Court.
"Analysis: A New Law to
Offset Citizens United?"
SCOTUSblog
January 21, 2010
Lyle Denniston
President Obama ordered his aides on
Thursday "to get to work immediately with
Congress" to develop "a forceful response"
to the Supreme Court's ruling in the Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission
case. In a statement, the President
denounced the decision, saying it "has given
a green light to a new stampede of special
interest money in our politics." It was
obvious, therefore, that he was interested in
working with Congress to overturn the
decision, or at least to narrow it
significantly.
Unless he has in mind an amendment to the
Constitution, however, it is most unclear at
this point whether the lawmakers could do
anything-or much of anything-to cut
down on "special interest money" in
American politics. This was a constitutional
decision, laying down (essentially for the
first time), a sweeping free-speech right in
politics for "special interest" bodies of all
types with the concept of "speech" clearly
embracing spending money to influence
election outcomes. If individuals have
considerable freedom to express themselves
politically, corporations, labor unions, and
other "special interest" entities now do, too.
While the First Amendment's guarantees of
freedom are far from absolute, any time a
legislative or other government body
attempts to curtail those freedoms, the effort
starts with a decidedly negative outlook.
Such restrictions come with the heaviest
burden of proof of necessity that any
governmental act must put forth in order to
win judicial approval. And, on Thursday, the
Court simply made that burden a good deal
heavier in the realm of curbs on political
speech, in the form of spending money on
campaigns, or otherwise.
Given the degree to which many
Republicans in Congress had wished
longingly for a First Amendment decision
precisely like the one that emerged in
Citizens United, it is by no means a certainty
than the GOP leaders would enlist in what
the President's statement suggested should
be a "bipartisan" effort. In fact, the Senate
GOP leader, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky,
has been a consistent foe of federal
restrictions on corporate spending in
national politics, and was one of the leaders
six years ago of the effort to get the Court to
strike down an array of federal campaign
finance restrictions.
Moreover, given the election result Tuesday
in the Massachusetts race for a Senate seat,
there is reason to doubt that the White
House will be able to carry off a significant
effort to get a "forceful response" to Citizens
United, especially when the real-world
effect of that decision in federal campaigns
is likely to be greater spending in favor of
GOP candidates, since corporations have
deeper pockets than, say, labor unions.
As White House legislative analysts think of
potential responses to the ruling, it is
conceivable that they will not even try to put
new restraints on "special interest"
spending, because of the constitutional
barrier that now stands to stymie that
approach. So long as "special interest"
groups spend their political dollars on
or party organizations, the Citizens United
barrier to restrictions will be in place. There
thus are fewer options for a legislative
counter-measure.
The White House and Congress perhaps
could approach the new money situation
indirectly, by trying to put more distance
between corporate, union or other "special
interest" spending and the intended
beneficiaries of that spending: favored
candidates. One approach would be to
increase the transparency of "special
interest" spending by more rigorous
disclosure legislation, in hopes of exposing
more vividly who is in fact benefiting and,
perhaps, by embarrassing the beneficiaries.
(This is the one kind of legislative approach
that the Supreme Court upheld on
Thursday.)
Congress conceivably could attack the
perceived problem of money-in-politics by
another indirect means, by tightening
restrictions on dealings between lobbyists
and elected officials, including legislators.
Lobbying, too, has First Amendment
protection, but it is an activity that can be
regulated at least at the level of disclosure.
campaign efforts independent of candidates
A drastic approach might be to expand the
concept of questionable vote-buying, by
requiring a more detailed public accounting
of how lawmakers vote in relation to
lobbyists with whom they deal directly and
in relation to the industries who may benefit
from legislative favors that flow out of the
lobbyists' efforts. One perhaps frivolous
suggestion already making the rounds of
political conversation is to require
legislators to wear NASCAR-style uniforms,
emblazoned with the logos of their corporate
"sponsors."
Tightening of lobbying restrictions,
however, has been shown to be exceedingly
difficult to get through Congress, precisely
because there is no such thing as a
"bipartisan" consensus on the need for such
new measures.
Another indirect option (mentioned by a
reader of the blog) would be to move toward
public financing of congressional elections
and enhancing such financing arrangements
for the presidential candidates. That, it is
suggested, may move toward reducing the
influence of big-money donors, including
major corporations.
